An often mentioned obstacle for the use of Dempster-Shafer theory for the handling of uncertainty in expert systems is the computational complexity of the theory. One cause of this complexity is the fact that in Dempster-Shafer theory the evidence is represented by a belief function which is induced by a basic probability assignment, i.e. a probability measure on the powerset of possible answers to a question, and not by a probability measure on the set of possible answers to a question, like in a Bayesian approach. In this paper, we define a Bayesian approximation of a belief function and show that combining the Bayesian approximations of belief functions is computationally less involving than combining the belief functions themselves, while in many practical applications replacing the belief functions by their Bayesian approximations will not essentially affect the result.
Introduction
Recently, Dempster-Shafer theory (also known as° evidence theory or theory of belief functions), has received much, attention as°a promising theory for the handling°of uncertain information in expert systems:-Its main-attractions' are the ease with which uncertainty deriving froth ignorance is represented-and the possibility of combining evidence by Dempster's rule of combination. This latter feature seems to° give Dempster-`Shafer'°theory an advantage over=the Bayesian approach to the handling, of uncertainty; where in general the combination-of several bodiesrof evidence requires-very` strong independence assumptions. However, although the way uncertainty, is represented in Oempsfer-Shafer theory may be intuitively sound and attractive, it does causethe reasoning with uncertainty to be computationally 'very expensive:
Let O be a set of possible answers to a question: Then evidence may point to a proper subset of O without pointing to a particular element. E.g. some scratches on a forced door may tell an expert that the burglar was left-handed, without giving any clue to the question which left-handed person was the burglar: The Bayesian° representation of this evidence consists of a uniform distribution of the weight attributed to the evidence over all left-handed persons; while in Dempster-Shafer theory this weight is attributed to the-set of all left-handed persons without attributing `any weight to `aa particular Teft-hander: In Dempster-Shafer theory evidence is represented byabelief function which is induced by a probability measure on the powerset of O instead of by a probability measure on a itself, like in the Bayesian approach. A consequence flf this is that the amount of computation required for the combination of evidences by Dempster's rule increases exponentially with the cardinality of O, -which-is generally <found to'be a serious obstacle, for the use of Dempster-Shafer theory.
Barnett (1.981) has described an algorithm for Dempster's rule of combination which achieves computational savings in case the only proper subsets of O supported by the evidence are a singleton and its complement. Gordon and Shortliffe (1985) were not satisfied with this result, since they were attracted to Dempster-Shafer theory by its "potential for handling evidence. bearing on categories of diseases _as well as on specific disease entities They suggest an efficient algorithm for combining evidence which can be applied in case,the hypotheses of interest form a their algorithm only yields an;approxiznationof the result that would be obtained by, using the full hypothesis space, but it was improved on in this respect by Shafer and Logan (1987) . In this paper we define a Bayesian approximation of a belieffunctiot and show that in general the combination of Bayesian approximations of belief functions is computationally less involving than the combination of the belief functions themselves. If combining the belief functions would yield a Bayesian belief function, .e. a probability measure on O, then the substitution of belief functions by their Bayesian approximation will. not affect the result .of Dempster's rule. In general, the combination of Bayesian approximations of belief functions yields the Bayesian approximation of the combination of those belief functions. This property makes-the results obtained by employing Bayesian approximations =useful in at least those cases, w.hereaone is interested in final conclusions about the elements of rather than ;subsets ,of: O: = ,, y Section 1 reviews the basics ;of_Dempster-Shafer theory. In section 2 the Bayesian approximation of a belief function is defined and some properties of this approximation are given. The remaining sections are devoted ;to the relation -between a belief function and its Bayesian approximation; a sdi^;gression on the, (at ;least, formally) -interesting -_space;of generalized belief functions and a description of the algorithm for the combination of evidence by. applying Dempster's rule to, ayesianapproximations.
. D.empster-Blu er . l eory L;
In this. section we-;briefly explain some-no. tions. and terminology of -FDempster=Shafer theory. For a more detailed exposition and some background information see e.g. Shafer (1976) . or'aordon£and Shortliffe1985 << Let O be a set of .mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses about, some problem domain, (O ,may be regarded to be, a set-of possible answers .,to a question. is-that §the,-combined effect of the assignment of-(A) probability mass to Ai and the assignment of m(Bj) probability mas-s"to Bj is the assignment of m(A)-ff(Bj) probability mass to AinBj. A given subset A of O may of course be the intersection of Ai and Bi for not exists or that Bel and Bel' are not combinable.
We list some useful properties of Q+ : properties; m(C) -10921C1, is better suited in this respect..See Dubois and Prade (1987b) and Ramer (1987) .)
The following proposition summarizes some trivial facts:
Proposition 1
Bel = Bel iff Bel is Bayesian iff the Bayesian constant of Bet = 1.
(ii)
Bel and Bel' are not combinable iff Bel and Bel' are not combinable.
Proof .. 
.ErF=C
Since the Bayesian approximation of a belief function is Bayesian, the combination of Bayesian approximations will also be Bayesian. Hence, a necessary condition for the combination of Bayesian approximations to agree with the combination of the belief functions themselves is that this latter combination, is Bayesian: Proposition 3 shows that this; condition is also sufficient Proposition 3 Let I be some non-empty set and assume that the belief functions from The term "Bayesian approximation" may be somewhat misleading, since there is for example probably no natural concept of distance between two be-lief'functions with respect to which Bel is the Bayesian belief-function closest to Bet. Our justification of the term is that in many cases one can draw conclusions from the Bayesian approximation of a belief function: which are similar to those that can be drawn from the belief functions themselves.
If this would not be the case, then Bayesian approximations would not be very useful, since proposition 3 shows that the conditions under which the combination of Bayesian approximations give exactly the same result _as the co functions themselves are rather strict.
Although evidence may point to subsets of the frame of discernment O without The choice for the minimal ordering corresponds with a rather cautious approach -the ordering.ofelements with respect to-their certainty (resulting in general only yin a partial ordering), whereas -the: choice for the ordering by. average--requires a rather audaciousapproach. =ln_table 1 the orderings and <av are compared with the plausibility ordering However, to conclude that a particular element a from O is (likely to be) the case it often does not suffice to know that a is at least as certain as any bE U for any reasonable ordering of the elements of C) with respect to their. certainty E g. if the belief interval of a is [0 5;O 55]: and that of b is [0.440.45]:, then, for .any reasonable, ordering `a > b, but for many. applications it would be unwise to-disregard the possibility that b is the case. In fact, to conclude a it is often necessary -and sufficient that for ali,b:, a}) »_Pl(;{b}). This justifies to some extent the dominant role of plausibility in the process of deciding between elements on the basis of,<pr
Another possible (partial) justification of the bias of plausibility of elements may be extracted from the fact thatDempster's rule is, also somewhat biassed towards=plaus bility This fact is illustrated by the .be a belief function8 are not necessarily by the with:a belief function like Bel'. One may conclude that if one is interested in about the elements of then and therefore the Bayesian approximation, may often, yield sufficient information. . r,Y However,, one. cannot always choose the frame of discernment to consist just the propositions one is interested in, since the application :of Dempster's rule: requires. the .frame of discernment to -discern all relevant interaction of the evidence to.be:coxnbined. (See Shafer (1976) , chapter. 8..) Therefore the frame :may contain some propositions which refer, to details in which one is not primarily._interested.
In general we have the following inequalities: max{m({a}) I aE A} < P1(A) <_ Pl(A)/c 1 -(1 -Bel(A))/c <_ Bel(A) <_ 1 -max{n({a}) I ao A} These inequalities are only likely to give some information if the Bayesian constant is close to 1. One might be inclined to think that, the.comb nation by Dempster's rule increases precision in the sense that the Bayesian constant of the combination is (weakly) larger than the Bayesian constants of the belief functions which are combined.:This would imply that as the number of combinations increases, so would the likelihood of the above inequalities being informative. Unfortunately, this is not the case since, as .is shown in the following section, the application of Dempster's rule involves a normalizing step which may cause the Bayesian constant to decrease. Determining the combination of the Bayesian approximation of n belief functions involves several normalizing steps: n applications off and n-l applications of (P yield a total of 2n-i normalizing steps. The following proposition, shows that all these normalizing,, steps can be merged into one step. First we need some definitions. , (11 f(mi)(fb})) bE iet is easy to see that the computation as described in step (ii), only requires time polynomial in 101, while, in general, the computation of the combination of_ Be1 would require time exponential in the cardinality of 0. However, this does not imply that the combination of belief functions is always computationally more involving than the Still, there are some situations in which it is, from a computational point of view, clearly advantageous to combine the Bayesian -approximations rather than the belief functions themselves. E.g. if the number of combinations, i.e. 111, is not too small relative to 101 (in that case the computational savings' obtained by combining the Bayesian approximations in stead of the belief functions themselves weighs up against the additional work needed to compute the Bayesian approximations) or if the evidence is not-given in terms of basic probability assignments, but in terms of the plausibility of the elements of a (this would make step (i) redundant, since replacing f(m) by Pli in step (ii) will not affect the result). In short, for many applications it might be worth while: to consider the possibility of using Bayesian approximations in stead of the belief functions themselves.
